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Should Satellite Pirates Walk the Plank? 
Navigating the High Seas of the Federal Wiretap Act 
Robert B. Preston* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) is a technology that transmits 
digitalized audio and video signals to homes and businesses around 
the world via a network of orbital satellites. DBS providers generate 
revenue by charging viewers a monthly subscription fee for access to 
their systems. However, not all individuals who enjoy DBS 
programming compensate the providers for the service. Signal 
thieves, or pirates, use unauthorized devices to surreptitiously 
intercept and view the DBS providers’ encrypted signals. 
Accordingly, DBS providers have initiated an aggressive campaign to 
plunder these pirates.  
Through investigative efforts, DBS providers have procured 
evidence proving that some consumers have purchased pirate access 
equipment.1 Under section 2512(1)(b) of the Wiretap Act,2 as 
amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(ECPA),3 possession of such equipment is illegal.4 However, section 
2520(a) provides that anyone whose “electronic communication is 
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of [the 
Wiretap Act] may in a civil action recover from the person . . . which 
engaged in that violation.”5 DBS providers argue that the conduct 
 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law; B.S. cum laude (2003), 
Northwestern University. 
 1. See Sylvia Hsieh, Direct TV  Sues Consumers over Satellite Signal Theft, LAW WKLY. 
USA, June 23, 2003, at 15. 
 2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20 (2000).  
 3. Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b). 
 5. Id. § 2520(a); see infra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
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specified in section 2512(1)(b) is encompassed by section 2520(a) 
because of the phrase, “in violation of [the Wiretap Act].”6 A 
minority of courts that have considered this issue have been 
persuaded by this logic. Alleged pirates argue, and a majority of 
courts have held, that section 2520(a) does not provide a private 
cause of action against the mere possession of such equipment. 
Accordingly, this Note focuses on this conflict and the arguments 
put forth by each side to buttress their respective positions. Part II 
begins by tracing the events that instigated this debate. Part II also 
discusses the statutory framework at the heart of this dispute, and 
outlines the divergent bodies of case law. Part III dissects the 
arguments advanced by each side, and considers the merits of each in 
light of common canons of statutory interpretation. Finally, Part IV 
concludes that the majority position is correct. 
II. CONGRESS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE COURTS 
A. Background 
To view DBS programming, viewers must acquire a fixed outdoor 
satellite dish.7 The dish transmits signals to an indoor receiver that 
feeds them into a television monitor.8 DirecTV, the nation’s leading 
DBS provider, claims that it has invested more than $1.25 billion in 
the development of its system.9 
To protect their investments, DBS providers digitally encrypt, or 
scramble, their signals to prevent unauthorized access.10 Typically, 
indoor receivers feature a removable access card that contains the 
information necessary to decrypt, or unscramble, the signals.11 
Consumers pay an average of $61 per month for access to these 
services.12 
 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a). 
 7. See Peter Shinkle, DirecTV Adopts Scorched-Earth Policy to Stop Pirates from 
Stealing Signals, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 22, 2003. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Dan Christensen, DirecTV Suing Customers Directly, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., June 
17, 2003. 
 10. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124, 1125 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 11. Id.; see also Hsieh, supra note 1, at 15. 
 12. Kevin Poulsen, DirecTV Dragnet Snares Innocent Techies, SECURITYFOCUS, July 17, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/17
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However, individuals have developed various pirate access 
devices capable of unscrambling the signals without the authorization 
of or payment to the DBS providers.13 Of the two DBS providers in 
the United States, DirecTV and Dish Network, DirecTV has been 
hardest hit.14 Unauthorized viewing, or “pirating,” costs DirecTV an 
estimated $1.2 billion each year.15 Accordingly, DirecTV has spent 
considerable resources to combat what essentially constitutes theft of 
its product. In the early stages of this effort, DirecTV targeted the 
producers, marketers and sellers of pirate access devices.16 Through 
investigation of these providers, DirecTV obtained information 
suggesting that tens of thousands of consumers purchased pirate 
access devices.17 DirecTV then initiated two programs, the “End User 
 
2003, http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6402. 
 13. The struggle between DBS providers and the producers of pirate access devices is a 
colorful game of cat and mouse. The original devices were little more than preprogrammed 
access cards that enabled viewers to decrypt DBS signals. DirecTV, Inc. v. Little, No. CV-03-
2407 RMW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16350, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2004). Thereafter, pirates 
began to use access card rewriters to continually update their cards. Id. Whenever the DBS 
providers updated their encryption technologies, hackers would publish the new codes on their 
websites, and viewers simply reformatted their cards using the rewriters. See Dorothy 
Pomerantz, Stealing the Show, FORBES.COM, May 29, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/ 
05/29/cz_dp_0529directv.html. In order to combat the theft of their product, DBS providers 
occasionally implement electronic countermeasures (ECMs), which are signals that target and 
disable illegally modified access cards by reprogramming the cards to run in an endless loop. 
Little, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *4. To combat this problem, pirates created devices, dubbed 
“unloopers,” to reprogram the cards to their previous configuration. Id.; see also Arik 
Hesseldahl, TV Pirates Smacked down, FORBES.COM, Jan. 29, 2001, http://www.forbes.com/ 
2001/01/29/0129directv.html. 
 14. In 2003, The Carmel Group, a satellite consulting firm, estimated that “2.2 million 
Americans [would] steal satellite service from . . . DirecTV compared with 720,000 from 
DirectTV rival Echostar.” Pomerantz, supra note 13. The Carmel Group estimates that the 
number of pirates stealing DirecTV’s service could inflate to 3.3 million by 2006. Id. Piracy is 
more of a problem for DirecTV than its rival because its system is easier to hack. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Shinkle, supra note 7. Additionally, DirecTV has sought to shut down websites 
devoted to DBS theft. On April 30, 2003, a Florida judge granted a restraining order shutting 
down sixty-three web sites. Pomerantz, supra note 13. The largest of these sites, “Decoder 
News,” had more than 23,000 paying subscribers. Christensen, supra note 9. DirecTV claims 
that it intends to pursue those who frequented these sites. Id. 
 17. “In some cases, DirectTV used federal civil forfeiture laws under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act to get local police to raid companies that sell pirating equipment.” 
Hsieh, supra note 1, at 15. 
 For instance, in 2001, federal investigators raided Fulfillment Plus, a mailing facility used 
by various mail order and internet retailers to facilitate their businesses. DirecTV, Inc. v. 
Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124, 1125 (11th Cir. 2004). DirecTV executed writs of seizure at 
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Discovery Group” and the “End User Recovery Project,” to mitigate 
signal theft by going after these consumers directly.18  
Armed with this information, DirecTV’s end user groups 
commenced a second, more controversial assault. DirecTV sent 
demand letters to all consumers linked with the purchase of a pirate 
access device.19 These letters listed a number of federal statutes that 
deal with the interception of electronic signals.20 Recipients were 
 
Fulfillment Plus. Id. Through the ensuing investigation, DirecTV secured hundreds of sales 
records and credit card receipts evidencing the purchase of pirate access devices. Id. This raid 
gave rise to a number of cases, including DirecTV, Inc. v. Cardona, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1357 
(M.D. Fla. 2003), and DirecTV, Inc. v. Drury, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2003).  
 18. Hsieh, supra note 1, at 15. 
 19. In 2002 and 2003, DirecTV sent out more than 100,000 letters. Id. 
 20. One such letter, dated June 13, 2003, provides: 
The DIRECTV End User Development Organization is responsible for the 
investigation of individuals receiving DIRECTV programming without authorization. 
Illegal reception and use of DIRECTV is accomplished through the use of modified 
DIRECTV Access Cards (sometimes referred to as “test cards”) and other illegal 
signal theft devices. 
Business records recently obtained by this office show that you purchased illegal 
signal theft equipment to gain unauthorized access to DIRECTV programming. We are 
contacting you because your purchase and use, or attempted use, of illegal signal theft 
equipment to access DIRECTV programming violates federal and state laws. 
Federal and state statutes impose serious civil damages against those who possess and 
use illegal theft equipment. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (making it illegal to receive assist 
another in receiving an encrypted satellite signal); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)(making it 
illegal to intercept an encrypted satellite signal); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(making it 
illegal to circumvent a technological measure such as DIRECTV conditional access 
system). So strict are these statutes that Congress has made the mere possession of 
signal theft equipment a violation of federal law in certain circumstances. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b)(making it illegal to “possess” an electronic, mechanical or other 
device sent by mail, knowing or having reason to know that the design of the devise 
renders it primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of an encrypted satellite 
signal). 
Your purchase, possession and use of the signal theft equipment to gain unauthorized 
access to DIRECTV’s satellite television programming subjects you to statutory 
damages of up to $10,000 per violation. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3). Moreover, your 
involvement in modifying devices to illegally gain access to DIRECTV’s 
programming increases potential statutory damages to $100,000. Finally, these statutes 
allow DIRECTV to recover from you compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ 
fees and other expenses. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(c)(3)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b). Thus, 
individuals in any way involved with illegal signal theft equipment face substantial 
monetary damage awards for their conduct. 
DIRECTV is making this offer to rectify past misappropriations of its satellite 
programming by users of signal theft equipment and to prevent the use of illegal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/17
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instructed to contact DirecTV or face litigation and damages of 
$100,000 or more.21 As to those who opted to settle, DirecTV 
demanded that the alleged pirate surrender all illegal devices, vow 
never to buy them again, and pay damages of approximately $3500.22  
 
access devices in the future. Satellite piracy is illegal and results in unfair expense to 
DIRECTV and its paying subscribers. For this reason, DIRECTV actively pursues 
legal action against those engaged in signal theft. 
With the above goals in mind and in light of DIRECTV’s signal theft claims against 
you, we would like to resolve this matter with you. In return for your cooperation, 
DIRECTV is willing to forego its claims against you for violations accruing prior to 
the date of this letter. DIRECTV is prepared to release its claim in return for your 
agreement to: (1) surrender all illegally modified Access Cards or other satellite signal 
theft devices in your possession, custody or control; (2) execute a written statement to 
the effect that you will not purchase or use illegal signal theft devices to obtain satellite 
programming in the future, nor will you have any involvement in the unauthorized 
reception and use of DIRECTV’s satellite television programming; and (3) pay a 
monetary sum to DIRECTV for your past wrongful conduct and the damages thereby 
incurred by the company. 
If you should choose to reject DIRECTV’s settlement offer, or should you fail to 
respond, please be advised that DIRECTV will take all measures to preserve its rights 
and remedies under federal and state law. This may involve the initiation of legal 
proceedings in Federal District Court seeking the award of damages and other relief 
discussed above. 
While we are willing to discuss this matter with you, DIRECTV will not imprudently 
and indefinitely wait for you to acknowledge your unlawful conduct. Therefore, to 
discuss the contents of this letter, you must contact an investigator at [redacted] 
on or before 6:00 p.m., Pacific Standard Time, June 27, 2003. Any available 
Investigator can handle your call. Please reference your case number . . . when you 
call. After that date, DIRECTV will abandon its attempts to negotiate and/or amicably 
resolve this matter. In any event, as a result of this investigation, DIERCTV Customer 
Service representatives will not be able handle questions regarding your illegal access 
to DIRECTV satellite programming. Please direct any and all future inquiries to 
this office. 
There is little question that you will benefit by resolving this matter through informal 
discussion. Illegal access to DIRECTV programming is a serious problem and, 
consequently, DIRECTV has no choice but to fully pursue illegal residential access 
cases to the end. . .  
Letter from DirecTV to Customer, June 13, 2003, available at http://www.directvdefense.org/ 
files/letter2.pdf. Additional sample letters are available at http://www.directvdefense.org/files/ 
letter1.pdf (last visited May 16, 2006); http://www.overhauser.com/DTV/Articles/Secure% 
20Letters%20I.pdf (last visited May 16, 2006); http://www.overhauser.com/DTV/Articles/ 
Secure%20Letters%20II.pdf (last visited May 16, 2006).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.; see also Christensen, supra note 9. 
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Because satellite signal interception is a passive process, DirecTV 
cannot determine if pirates are actually using the devices to intercept 
their signals. A consumer’s purchase of a pirate access device is the 
only evidence of pirating available to DirectTV. Nevertheless, as of 
the end of June, 2003, DirecTV sent more than 100,000 demand 
letters and filed more than 8700 lawsuits around the country.23 
B. The Federal Wiretap Act24 
In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act (OCCSSA).25 Title III of the OCCSSA is commonly 
known as the “Wiretap Act.” Section 2511(1) of the Wiretap Act 
provides that “any person who . . . uses . . . intercepts . . . [or] 
discloses . . . the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
 
 23. Hsieh, supra note 1, at 15. 
 24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20. The Wiretap Act is not the only statute used to prosecute 
pirates. Section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(a), (e)(4) (2000), as 
amended by the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (CCPA), Pub. L. No. 98–549, 98 
Stat. 2779 (1984), and the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 (SHVA), Pub. L. No. 100–667, 
102 Stat. 3949 (1988), prescribes criminal penalties for anyone who intentionally intercepts or 
aids in the interception of commercial communications. This statute provides, in pertinent part, 
that “[no] person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or 
foreign communication by radio and use such communication (or any information therein 
contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 605(a). Section 605(e)(4) extends liability to “[a]ny person who manufactures, . . . sells, or 
distributes any . . . device or equipment, knowing or having reason to know that the device or 
equipment is primarily of assistance in the unauthorized decryption of [satellite television 
signals].” Id. § 605(e)(4). 
 The clear meaning of these statutes sharply delineates the activity that is prohibited by the 
law. Purchase and possession are conspicuously absent. Accordingly, numerous courts have 
confirmed that these statutes do not prohibit mere purchase or possession of pirate access 
devices. See, e.g., Smith v. Cincinnati Post & Times-Star, 475 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1973); V 
Cable, Inc. v. Guercio, 148 F. Supp. 2d 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 Another statute often invoked in satellite piracy cases is the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA). 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000). This Act provides, in pertinent part, that “no 
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected by [the DCMA].” Id. Accordingly, the plain language of the Act clearly prohibits only 
the act of circumvention, not purchase or possession. 
 The foregoing statutes are quite effective when DirecTV has evidence that its signals were 
actually intercepted. In most cases, however, DirecTV has no such evidence. Moreover, the 
Wiretap Act arguably provides for a private cause of action. 
 25. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C.). Title III was essentially a combination of the Federal Wire Interception Act and the 
Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1967. S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/17
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communication . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or 
shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).”26 
Prior to 1986, section 2512 provided: 
[A]ny person who willfully. . . . possesses, or sells any . . . 
device knowing or having reason to know that the design of 
such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the 
surreptitious interception of wire or oral wire communications 
. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.27 
 In addition, section 2520 provided that “[a]ny person whose wire 
or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation 
of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any 
person who intercepts, discloses, or uses . . . such communications, 
and (2) be entitled to recover [damages and attorney’s fees] from any 
such person.”28  
DBS providers argue that the phrase “in violation of this chapter” 
provides a private right of action under section 2520 against the 
possession of a pirate access device, conduct that is criminalized in 
section 2512. This argument was first asserted by the plaintiff in 
Flowers v. Tandy Corp.29 
 
 26. “[W]hoever violates subsection (1) of this section shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a). “[T]he person who 
engages in such conduct shall be subject to suit by the Federal Government in a court of 
competent jurisdiction.” Id. § 2511(5)(a)(i). 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1968). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. II, § 211(c), 84 Stat. 
473 (1970)). At the time that the Wiretap Act was enacted, this section read: 
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in 
violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any person who 
intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use 
such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person— 
(a) actual damages . . .  
(b) punitive damages; and 
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. 
Id. § 2520 (1970). 
 29. 773 F.2d 585 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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C. The Seed of Conflict: Flowers v. Tandy Corp. 
Flowers, the seminal case concerning the proper interpretation of 
section 2520, involved the Tandy Corporation (“Tandy”), which 
manufactured telephone recording devices, and William Flowers, 
who purchased a device to surreptitiously record telephone 
conversations between his wife and a suspected lover.30 The co-
plaintiffs filed a civil action against Tandy for aiding and abetting the 
illegal wiretapping by selling the device.31 Though section 2520 only 
provided a civil right of action to persons “whose wire or oral 
communication is intercepted . . . or used in violation of this 
chapter,”32 the co-plaintiffs argued that section 2512, which 
criminalized the possession or sale of such a device, could be used to 
determine whether Tandy was civilly liable under section 2520.33 
This argument was premised on an interpretation of section 2520 that 
presupposed that the phrase, “or used in violation of this chapter,” 
encompassed conduct prohibited in section 2512.34 
The jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded $60,000 in actual 
and $22,000 in punitive damages.35 On appeal, the circuit court began 
its analysis by unequivocally stating that the “district court erred in 
permitting the jury to consider the criminal statute . . . as a basis for 
imposing civil liability.”36 In denying an encompassing reading of 
section 2520, Circuit Judge Phillips, writing for the court, noted that 
section 2520 closely tracks the language of section 2511.37 As such, 
he reasoned that section 2520 was “not susceptible to a construction 
which would provide a cause of action against one who manufactures 
or sells a device in violation of § 2512 but does not engage in conduct 
violative of § 2511.”38 
 
 30. Id. at 586. 
 31. Id. at 587. 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970). For the full text of the statute as it existed at the time of the 
case, see supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 33. Flowers, 773 F.2d at 587. 
 34. Id. at 588. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 588–89. 
 38. Id. The specific language the court rejected as providing a private cause of action for 
violations of section 2512 provided that a party would have a private cause of action “against 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/17
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This conclusion is supported by the general theory that “implied 
causes of action are disfavored and should be found only where a 
statute clearly indicates that the plaintiff is one of a class for whose 
benefit the statute was enacted.”39 Congress enacted section 2512, a 
criminal statute, to benefit society as a whole by ridding the market 
of pirate devices.40 It enacted section 2520, on the other hand, to 
protect the specific victims of illegal interception.41 
Following Flowers, few courts considered the circumstances 
necessary for a plaintiff to file a private cause of action under section 
2520. However, as telecommunications technology became more 
sophisticated, Congress realized that the Wiretap Act needed to be 
amended to stay germane.42  
D. The ECPA 
Nearly twenty years after the Wiretap Act’s enactment, Senators 
Leahy (D-VT) and Mathias (R-MD) introduced the ECPA to the 
Senate.43 Senator Leahy noted that the Wiretap Act of 1968 was 
“hopelessly out of date.”44 In response, Congress enacted the ECPA, 
which was the first major revision of the Wiretap Act. Little has 
changed in the relevant sections of the Wiretap Act since the ECPA’s 
passage. 
 
any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, 
disclose, or use such communications.” Id. at 587 n.2.  
 39. Id. at 589 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)); see also infra note 151. 
 40. Flowers, 773 F.2d at 589; see also Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. 
Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983). In Cox, the court held, as matter of law, that section 2520 did not 
encompass action prohibited in section 2511(1)(a). Id. at 382. This decision was largely based 
on the legislative history of the Wiretap Act wherein Congress manifested its intent to protect 
only private communications from illegal wiretapping. Id. 
 41. Flowers, 773 F.2d at 589. 
 42. The Senate reported that the “bill amends the 1968 law to update and clarify Federal 
privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and 
telecommunication technologies.” S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. 
 43. 132 CONG. REC. 14599 (1986). 
 44. Id. at 14600. The Senator elaborated that “[e]ighteen years ago, Congress could not 
appreciate—or in some cases even contemplate—[today’s] telecommunications and computer 
technology.” Id.  
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In section 2512(1)(b), the ECPA substituted the word 
“intentionally” for “willfully.”45 The amendment also changed “wire 
or oral communication” to “wire, oral, or electronic communication” 
in five locations.46 The ECPA also largely rewrote section 2520.47 
The amended statute read, in relevant part, that, “except as provided 
in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or electronic 
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in 
violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person 
or entity . . . which engaged in that violation such relief as may be 
appropriate.”48 
 
 45. S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577. 
 46. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101(c)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (emphasis added). After the 
enactment of the ECPA, section 2512 provided:  
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who 
intentionally— 
. . . .  
(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic, mechanical, or other 
device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it 
primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications . . . or  
(c) places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any 
advertisement of— 
(i) any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing or having reason to know that 
the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious 
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications; or  
(ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or other device, where such advertisement 
promotes the use of such device for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of 
wire, oral, or electronic communications, knowing or having reason to know that such 
advertisement will be sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both.  
18 U.S.C. § 2512. 
 47. For the full text of the statute prior to the 1986 amendments, see supra note 28 and 
accompanying text.  
 48. Section 2511(2)(a)(ii) provides: 
Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communication service 
. . . are authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons 
authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications or to conduct 
electronic surveillance . . . if such provider . . . has been provided with— 
(A) a court order directing such assistance signed by the authorizing judge, or 
(B) a certification in writing . . . that no warrant or court order is required by law, that 
all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required 
. . . .  
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii). 
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E. What Is a Device Primarily Useful for the Surreptitious 
Interception of Electronic Communication? 
The minority’s argument presumes that individuals in possession 
of a pirate access device act in violation of section 2512(1)(b). 
However, some courts have been unwilling to accept this 
presumption. The ECPA amended section 2512 to impose criminal 
liability on anyone who “possesses[] or sells any . . . device, knowing 
. . . that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the 
purpose of the surreptitious interception . . . electronic 
communications.”49 In the early 1990s, a series of criminal cases at 
the circuit level attempted to discern whether pirate access devices 
were “primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious 
interception of . . . electronic communications.”50 
In United States v. Herring,51 the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
ECPA regulated only private, or point-to-point, communications.52 
The court emphasized that the legislative history of the ECPA 
suggests that the Communications Act alone protects DBS signals.53 
However, in United States v. McNutt,54 the Tenth Circuit gave the 
ECPA a much broader application. In McNutt, the court stated that 
the “plain wording of [the ECPA] encompasses satellite television 
signals.”55 
Although the Eleventh Circuit provided a far more thorough 
analysis than the Tenth with regard to the meaning of “electronic 
communications” as used in the ECPA, it erroneously reasoned that 
Congress would not enact two laws, the Communications Act and the 
 
 49. Id. § 2512; see also supra note 46. 
 50. See Samuel Rosenstein, Note, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
and Satellite Descramblers: Toward Preventing Statutory Obsolescence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
1451, 1452–53 n.13 (1992) (listing cases). 
 51. 933 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 52. Id. at 938; see also United States v. Hux, 940 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1991) (adopting 
the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation).  
 53. Herring, 933 F.2d at 937–38. The Senate report relied on most heavily by the court 
read: “The private viewing of satellite cable programming . . . will continue to be governed 
exclusively by . . . the Communications Act . . . and not by [the ECPA].” S. REP. NO. 99-541, 
as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3576. For a discussion of the Communications Act, 
see supra note 24. 
 54. 908 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 55. Id. at 564. 
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ECPA, to govern the same thing.56 Not only is there patent evidence 
on the face of the statute and in the legislative history57 of the ECPA 
suggesting that the Act is meant to govern satellite communications, 
but the legislative history of the Satellite Home Viewers Act of 1988 
(SHVA), a 1988 amendment to the Communications Act, also 
indicated that the two acts are intended to overlap.58 
Herring also touched upon a second issue as to whether a device 
is primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of electronic 
communications. Namely, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether 
the technology used to intercept the signals could also be used for 
other purposes.59 On this point, the Senate noted that "[a] device will 
not escape the prohibition merely because it may have innocent uses. 
The crucial test is whether the design of the device renders it 
primarily useful for surreptitious listening.”60 In Herring, the court 
ruled that the devices at bar were no different in design than other, 
legitimate descramblers, and therefore that section 2512(b)(1) did not 
apply.61 
DirecTV, Inc. v. Little62 provides a vivid example of this debate as 
it exists today. In Little, the defendant operated “Techs on Call,” a 
 
 56. Herring, 933 F.2d at 938. 
 57. Section 2510(12) of the Wiretap Act indicates that “electronic communications” 
includes “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or 
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.”  
 58. Section “2511(1) [of the ECPA] . . . prohibit[s] the unauthorized interception and use 
of satellite [television].” H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II) (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5638, 5643 (1988). For a discussion of the SHVA, see supra note 24. 
 59. Herring, 933 F.2d at 933–34.  
 60. S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2183. 
 61. Herring, 933 F.2d at 934. Through expert testimony, the court found: 
[S]oftware built into the descramblers was seventy-five percent identical to that in 
authorized descrambler units . . . Because the design of the descramblers gives them 
significant nonsurreptitious and legitimate uses, and therefore the descramblers are not 
primarily useful for surreptitious listening, there is no possibility that appellants could 
have been convicted under section 2512(1)(b) prior to 1986. 
Id.; see also United States v. Schweihs, 569 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that a device 
constructed or purchased specifically for use in covert wiretapping or eavesdropping is not 
prohibited by section 2512 if its design characteristics do not render it primarily useful for that 
purpose). 
 62. No. CV-03-2407 RMW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16350 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2004). 
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small computer repair and network consulting company.63 As part of 
his business, the defendant purchased forty-six reader/writers from a 
distributor of pirate access devices.64 DirecTV, however, claimed that 
this equipment “was designed for the purpose of circumventing 
DirecTV’s conditional access controls.”65 DirecTV also underscored 
the fact that the equipment was specifically marketed as a pirate 
access device, not as a programmable access card appropriate for 
legal uses.66 Finally, DirecTV claimed that the defendant purchased 
additional software from other websites devoted to pirating satellite 
signals.67 Despite this evidence, the court stated that it could not rule 
as a matter of law that the reader/writer was designed primarily for 
illegal purposes.68  
Despite Little, modern courts are likely to accept that a pirate 
access device is primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of 
electronic communications. This is evidenced by the fact that this 
issue is rarely contested at trial. Moreover, in United States v. 
Lande,69 the Ninth Circuit held that “[s]atellite transmissions could 
not be intercepted any more ‘surreptitious[ly]’ than by these devices 
which cannot be detected by producers of electronic television 
programming.”70 The Ninth Circuit also held that the technical design 
of the device made it primarily useful for illegal purposes.71 
 
 63. Id. at *4–*5. 
 64. Id. at *7. The defense wrote a whitepaper detailing the steps by which the White Viper 
reader/writers could be used to implement a secured network access system. Id. at *12. 
 65. Id. at *8 (quoting an expert witness for DirecTV). The witness pointed to a number of 
features that indicated that the equipment was specially designed to serve an illegal purpose. 
Specifically, the witness asserted that the absence of a “card present” indicator on the 
reader/writer made it incompatible with Microsoft Windows. Id. at *10. Moreover, the unique 
layout of the reader/writer made it compatible with the unique layout of DirecTV access cards. 
Id. 
 66. Id. at *11. 
 67. Id. at *14. 
 68. Id. at *26. 
 69. 968 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 70. Id. at 910; see also United States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561, 565 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the inherently surreptitious operations of a descrambler). 
 71. Lande, 968 F.2d at 910. The court stated: “It is difficult to imagine any purpose for 
these modified descramblers other than the unauthorized interception of satellite television 
signals. To be sure, before modification the descramblers might be put to legitimate use, but 
once modified they serve no purpose except to allow surreptitious interception.” Id.  
 See United States v. Harrell, 983 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1993). In Harrell, the court found that a 
device that could legally be used to descramble DBS signals became a device primarily useful 
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Because of the ambiguous nature of the use of these cards, critics 
argue that DirecTV’s indiscriminate campaign against all individuals 
who purchase pirate access devices is unethical—DirecTV not only 
snares signal pirates, but also innocent parties.72 As such, critics 
argue that DirecTV is abusing the system by refusing to conduct a 
preliminary investigation prior to sending its demand letters.73 Most 
of the individuals who receive the letters are either frightened and 
pay immediately, or find it cheaper to settle than to litigate the case.74 
DirecTV maintains that its campaign is not as haphazard as its 
critics claim. DirecTV asserts that it only sues people who “bought 
devices clearly designed to steal TV programming”75 from websites 
devoted to selling pirate access equipment.76 Despite DirecTV’s 
assertion of innocence, several defendants have filed counter-claims 
and pursued  class action claims under state deceptive trade practices77
 
for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications 
when the seal on the device was broken and a programmed computer chip containing the 
address of a paying customer was inserted. Id. at 38. The court found it unreasonable to believe 
that an individual, having spent approximately $300 for this modified chip, would primarily 
limit him or herself to programming for which he or she paid. Id.; see also United States v. 
Davis, 978 F.2d 415, 419 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that modifications to previously legal device 
rendered it suitable only for surreptitions use). 
 72. See Poulsen, supra note 12. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Hsieh, supra note 1, at 16 (quoting Christopher Murphy, DirecTV’s assistant general 
counsel). Murphy elaborated, ”[w]e’re suing people who bought reader-writers plus something 
else, such as hardware or software that, when combined with a reader-writer, can be used to 
pirate a satellite signal. We’re saying that anyone who bought a reader-writer plus something 
else cannot be using it for lawful purposes.” Id. 
 However, critics retort that the devices sold on pirating websites have the same 
specifications as those on more reputable websites; the products on pirate sites, however, are 
generally less expensive. Poulsen, supra note 12. “If somebody is sophisticated enough to be 
pursuing programming smart cards, they’re going to look at the specs of the device. They do 
not care how it is marketed; they’re going to get the best deal.” Id. 
 76. Poulsen, supra note 12. DirecTV spokesman, Robert Mercer, said, “how innocent is 
someone who goes to [a] website that is clearly identified as a pirate website that is devoted to 
selling equipment to steal satellite TV programming, and orders the equipment, knowing full 
well what they’re getting? That’s quite a stretch.” Id. 
 77. One theory suggests that DirecTV’s demand letters are unfair business practices 
because they assert that the consumer violated federal law even though DirecTV has no proof 
that the recipient actually intercepted the signal. Hsieh, supra note 1, at 15. In DirecTV, Inc. v. 
Cephas, 294 F. Supp. 2d 760 (M.D.N.C. 2003), a defendant brought a counterclaim against 
DirecTV asserting a violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
(UDTPA), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1, which “prohibits the general use of unfair or deceptive 
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and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 
statutes.78 
F. Post-ECPA Case Law 
1. The Minority 
Oceanic Cablevision, Inc. v. M.D. Electronics79 was the first 
major opinion to disagree with Flowers. Oceanic, the plaintiff, was a 
cable television provider that received programs from suppliers and 
retransmitted them to paying customers.80 Like most cable systems, 
Oceanic offered various levels of service.81 It transmitted premium 
channels in a scrambled form.82 Only customers who paid for the 
premium channels received the equipment necessary to legally 
descramble the signals.83 The defendant, however, developed and 
sold equipment capable of descrambling Oceanic’s signals, which 
allowed purchasers to enjoy unlimited access to premium channels 
 
practices in commerce.” Cephas, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 765. The court refused to grant DirecTV’s 
motion to dismiss the counterclaim, finding the defendant had sufficiently alleged that DirecTV 
had engaged in unfair practices by falsely accusing the defendants of a crime, representing that 
the distributor had the power of law enforcement, and threatening to take action not permitted 
by law. Id. at 766. But see DirecTV, Inc. v. Karpinsky, 269 F. Supp. 2d 918 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
In Karpinsky, the defendant raised a number of counterclaims against DirecTV, including 
deceptive trade practices under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 928. However, 
the court ruled that because Karpinsky was not a subscriber to DirecTV's services, the two 
parties were not engaged in trade or commerce, as defined and required by the act. Id. As such, 
the statute was inapplicable. Id. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2000). Under this statute, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the 
defendants committed two or more predicate offenses; (2) a RICO enterprise existed; (3) a 
nexus exists between the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise; and (4) an injury to 
the plaintiff’s business or property by reason of the first three factors. See DirecTV, Inc. v. 
Rayborn, No. 5:03-CV-59, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19680, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2003). In 
Rayborn, the court ruled in favor of DirecTV because the class’ complaint did not allege two or 
more predicate offenses described in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), and because it did not allege injury 
to its businesses or properties. Id. at *7–8. Moreover, the court noted that “a threat of litigation 
if a party fails to fulfil [sic] even a fraudulent obligation does not constitute extortion, and is 
insufficient to support a RICO claim as a matter of law.” Id. at *8 (citing Karpinsky, 269 F. 
Supp. 2d at 929–30). 
 79. 771 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Neb. 1991). 
 80. Id. at 1022. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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without paying the monthly fee and without Oceanic’s knowledge or 
consent.84  
Among other claims,85 Oceanic filed two claims premised on the 
amended Wiretap Act. Like the plaintiff in Flowers, Oceanic asserted 
that the sale of devices primarily useful for the surreptitious 
interception of electronic communications, criminalized in section 
2512, created a private right of action under section 2520.86 However, 
unlike Flowers, the court found in favor of Oceanic.87 
In Flowers, the Fourth Circuit ruled that section 2520 did not 
provide a private cause of action for violations contained in section 
2512.88 However, Congress enacted the ECPA after the Flowers 
decision. Consequently, the Oceanic court focused on the 
amendments to determine whether Flowers was still good law.89 
First, the court considered section 103 of the ECPA, which 
essentially rewrote section 2520.90 While the statute in effect at the 
time of Flowers provided that a cause of action would lie against 
“any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other 
person to intercept, disclose or use such communications,”91 the 
amended statute provides that a person shall have a private right of 
action against any person who has “intercepted, disclosed or 
intentionally used, in violation of this chapter,” the electronic 
communications of another.92 In light of the statute’s dramatically 
broadened scope, the court held that the plain language of section 
2520 “confers a private cause of action upon persons when the action 
is brought against parties that have violated the provisions of 
§§ 2510–2521.”93  
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Oceanic filed thirteen claims for relief, including two implicating the Wiretap Act. Of 
the remaining eleven, two were under RICO. Id. at 1022–24. Additionally, Oceanic filed a 
claim under the CCPA. Id. at 1024–25. The balance of the claims asserted various torts, 
including tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with prospective 
advantage, tortious interference with lawful business, and unfair competition. Id. at 1029–30. 
 86. Id. at 1025–26. 
 87. Id. at 1029. 
 88. Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 89. Oceanic, 771 F. Supp. at 1027–28. 
 90. Id. at 1027. 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970) (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. (2000) (emphasis added). 
 93. Oceanic, 771 F. Supp. at 1027; see also DirecTV, Inc. v. Drury, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1321 
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Subsequently, in DirecTV, Inc. v. Perez,94 DirecTV filed suit 
against a consumer for using unauthorized devices to intercept its 
signals. In a brief opinion, the court accepted the reasoning of 
Oceanic.95 Though the court conceded that this interpretation offers 
potential plaintiffs a broad ability to bring private rights of action, it 
posited that plaintiffs such as DirecTV have a strong incentive to 
protect their interests against unauthorized interception.96 The court 
reasoned that coupling this incentive with the right to bring a private 
cause of action will “decrease[] the burden on already overextended 
federal prosecutors to pursue criminal convictions under this 
statute.”97 This rationale has been dubbed the “private attorney 
general” rationale. 
Finally, in Community Televisions Systems, Inc. v. Caruso,98 a 
cable system operator sued for theft of its services under the 
Communications Act of 1934.99 Specifically, the defendants 
purchased devices that allowed them to view pay-per-view 
programming without paying.100 The plaintiff’s primary evidence was 
a receipt, confiscated from a dealer, indicating that the defendant 
purchased a pirate access device.101 The district court ruled in favor 
of the plaintiff and awarded $10,000 in damages and attorney’s 
 
(M.D. Fla. 2003); DirecTV, Inc. v. Calamanco, No. 5:02-CV-4102-MWB, 2003 WL 21956187, 
at *2 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2003); DirecTV, Inc. v. EQ Stuff, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 
(C.D. Cal. 2002). In Drury, the court noted that the statutory language that persuaded the Fourth 
Circuit in Flowers to rule in favor of the defendant was no longer present in the amended 
version of the statute. Drury, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. Therefore, “[s]ection 2520 applies to all 
violations within Chapter 19 of Title 18 of the United States Code concerning ‘Wire and 
Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications,’ which 
includes 18 U.S.C. § 2512.” Id. The court concluded that DirecTV’s complaint “simply asserts 
a private cause of action that 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) expressly authorizes for violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b).” Id. 
 94. 279 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 95. Id. at 964.  
 96. Id. at 964–65. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 284 F.3d 430 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 99. Id. at 432. 
 100. Id. at 433. 
 101. Id. 
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fees.102 The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the purchase of a 
pirate access device raises a “rebuttable presumption” of liability.103  
2. The Majority 
In light of this controversy, the Eleventh Circuit opted to weigh in 
on the issue. In DirecTV, Inc. v. Treworgy,104 DirecTV acquired 
evidence through an investigation of a shipping facility that dealt 
with pirate access devices105 that the defendant, Treworgy, had 
purchased such a device.  
The district court granted Treworgy’s partial motion to dismiss.106 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.107 It began its analysis with 
the plain meaning of the Wiretap Act.108 First, the court established 
that sections 2520(a) and 2512(1)(b) deal with two distinct issues: 
section 2520(a) provides a civil remedy for the victim of a theft of 
electronic communications, while section 2512(1)(b) provides 
criminal punishment for those who steal electronic 
communications.109 Because it provides a civil remedy, section 2520 
defines both “victims for whose benefit the remedy exists and the 
offenders for whom liability is owed.”110 Specifically, the plaintiff is 
“any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is 
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this 
chapter.”111 The defendant, on the other hand, is “the person or entity 
which engaged in that violation.”112 Unlike the court in Oceanic,113 
the Eleventh Circuit construed the phrase, “in that violation,” 
narrowly.114 It held that the phrase “‘which engaged in that violation’ 
makes apparent the intent of Congress to limit liability to a certain 
 
 102. Id. at 434. 
 103. Id. at 436. 
 104. 373 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 105. Id. at 1125; see also supra note 17. 
 106. Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1125. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1126. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1127. 
 111. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)). 
 112. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)). 
 113. See supra notes 69–92 and accompanying text. 
 114. Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1127. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/17
p431 Preston book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Should Satellite Pirates Walk the Plank? 449 
 
 
class of defendants. Congress chose to confine private civil actions to 
defendants who had ‘intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used [a 
communication] in violation of . . . [the Wiretap Act].’”115  
In addition, the court articulated two policy considerations in 
support of its holding. First, the court contended that DirecTV’s 
argument was constitutionally problematic.116 For DirecTV to suffer 
harm from a pirate access device, a pirate must use the device to 
intercept DirecTV’s signals.117 Where, as here, DirecTV has evidence 
only that the defendant purchased a device, but no proof that the 
device was actually used to intercept its signals, DirecTV’s evidence 
proves only a hypothetical harm.118 Without a showing of actual 
harm, DirecTV cannot establish a “case or controversy,” as required 
by the Constitution.119  
Second, the court rejected the “private attorney general”120 
rationale set forth in Perez.121 The court cited a 2001 Supreme Court 
opinion in which Justice Scalia, writing for the court, noted that 
“‘courts may not create [a private right of action], no matter how 
desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the 
statute,’ because that is a determination Congress alone can make.”122 
 
 115. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.; see also DirecTV v. Amato, 269 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691 (E.D. Va. 2003). In Amato, 
the court reasoned that “a plaintiff must allege the unlawful possession and use of 
eavesdropping equipment in order to maintain a cause of action under § 2511, but the mere 
possession of that equipment, alone, affords no civil recovery under either code section.” Id. 
 119. Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1127 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). This section of the 
Constitution sets the metes and bounds of the judicial power of the federal courts. See also 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding a conjectural or hypothetical 
injury insufficient to establish constitutional standing). 
 120. Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1128–29. 
 121. DirecTV, Inc. v. Perez, 279 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964–65 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 122. Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1128–29 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–
87 (2001)); see also DirecTV, Inc. v. Westendorf, No. 3:03cv50210, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16236 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2003). In Westendorf, the court ruled that neither section 2520(a) nor 
section 2512(1)(b) gives rise to an implied cause of action. Id. at *3. Further, the court noted 
that Congress intended to create an express cause of action via section 2520(a). Id. at *4. When 
Congress provides an express cause of action, “an implied right of action is especially difficult 
to infer without powerful support in the legislative history.” Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the 
court noted that there is nothing in the legislative history of the Wiretap Act or its amendments 
that suggests that Congress intended to create an implied cause of action. Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
In Treworgy, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the issue at bar was 
“purely a matter of statutory interpretation.”123 In discerning the 
meaning of any statute, the initial inquiry should be limited to the 
language of the statute itself.124 However, section 2520 is not the 
paradigm of a carefully drafted statute. As a result, courts have come 
to contradictory conclusions regarding its proper interpretation. 
Accordingly, an analysis of the Wiretap Act should not look simply 
at the language of the Act, but should also examine the legislative 
history of the ECPA and various public policy rationales. 
A. The Four Corners of the Statute 
As made obvious by the split in authority, the majority and the 
minority both have colorable arguments that the plain meaning of 
section 2520(a) supports their positions.125 Specifically, the minority 
argues that the phrase “in violation of this chapter” refers to the entire 
Wiretap Act. Therefore, the mere possession of a pirate access 
device, criminalized in section 2512(1)(b), gives rise to a private 
cause of action.126 The majority, on the other hand, avers that the 
phrase “in violation of this chapter” is a prepositional phrase that 
modifies the preceding terms “intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally 
used.”127 Thus, only interception, disclosure and intentional use serve 
as the basis for a private cause of action.  
 
 123. Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1126. 
 124. The Eleventh Circuit, the same court that decided Treworgy, commented that “[w]hen 
the import of the words Congress has used is clear . . . we need not resort to legislative history, 
and we certainly should not do so to undermine the plain meaning of the statutory language.” 
Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 125. Both sides used common tools of statutory construction to construe the statute to 
support their side. However, numerous learned scholars have questioned the probative weights 
of the common canons. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision 
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400–
06 (1950). 
 126. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Drury, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1322–23 (M.D. Fla. 2003); 
see also supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1127. In DirecTV, Inc. v. Bertram, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1021 
(D. Minn. 2003), the court explained that “as a matter of grammar and sentence structure, the 
phrase ‘that violation’ refers to the interception, disclosure, or intentional use of 
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Section 2520 provides that anyone who violates the Act is liable 
to the injured party, with the narrow exception of electronic 
communication service providers under section 2511(2)(a)(ii).128 
Under the rule of exclusio unius est expressio alterius, when one 
provision is specifically excluded, all others are presumed to be 
included.129 Thus, because section 2520 excludes section 
2511(2)(a)(ii), it is presumed to include all other sections. If Congress 
intended to circumscribe the scope of section 2520, it could have 
easily done so. Moreover, the legislative history of the ECPA is void 
of any suggestion that section 2512 should be excluded.130  
The canon of construction known as ejusdem generis131 supports 
the majority’s position. This rule suggests that the specific actions 
enumerated in section 2520, interception and disclosure, limit the 
meaning of the phrase “used in violation of this chapter” to conduct 
that directly harms the plaintiff.132 
 
communications mentioned earlier in the sentence” and not to the entire Wiretap Act. Id. at 
1024. 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000); see supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 129. According to most federal courts, this maxim’s more conventional twin, expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, “is only a guide, whose fallibility can be shown by contrary 
indications that adopting a particular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any 
exclusion of its common relatives.” United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 56 (2002). In reference 
to exclusio unium est expressio alterius, the maxim at issue, the Fourth Circuit noted, “[w]e 
think that this ‘maxim’ is even more tenuous than its opposite.” Nelson v. Dalkon Shield 
Claimants Trust, No. 98-1080, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21387, at *8 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1998).  
 130. In Treworgy, the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue. 373 F.3d at 1127–28. Rather 
than considering the merits of the various canons of construction, the court looked to the 
language of the excluded section, section 2511(2)(a)(ii), to determine the reason for its 
exclusion. Id. This section excludes from liability any person or agency that assists law 
enforcement officers in wiretap activities. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (2000). The 
court believed that the contents of this exclusion “butresse[d] the conclusion that the liability 
created by section 2520(a) is confined to illegal interceptions, disclosures, and uses of 
electronic communications.” Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1127; see also supra notes 46–48 and 
accompanying text. 
 131. “A canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of 
specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type 
as those listed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004). 
 132. See, e.g., Heathman v. Giles, 374 P.2d 839 (Utah 1962). In Heathman, the lower court 
dismissed a plaintiff’s tort claim against a prosecutor for failure to file a bond as required by 
state statute. Id. at 839. The statute required the filing of a bond in actions brought against “any 
sheriff, constable, peace officer, state road officer, or any other person charged with the duty of 
enforcement of the criminal laws.” Id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the 
officials specifically enumerated were all badge-carrying officers who provided the front line of 
law enforcement and who faced unique risks. Id. at 840. As such, the phrase “any other person 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p431 Preston book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
452 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:431 
 
 
B. The Legislative History of the Wiretap Act 
The crux of the minority’s argument is the fact that the ECPA 
broadened the scope of the Wiretap Act beyond the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation in Flowers. The minority argues that Congress’ 
purpose in passing the ECPA was to create an effective mechanism 
for slowing the proliferation of unauthorized devices, which had 
become a significant problem since the passage of the Wiretap Act in 
1968.133 Indeed, Congress provided identical penalties for violation 
of sections 2511 and 2512, indicating that it viewed possession and 
sale as negatively as actual interception.134 Moreover, in Oceanic, the 
court cited a Senate report that indicated that a party “may bring a 
civil action under § 2520 whether or not the defendant has been 
subject to a criminal prosecution for the acts complained of.”135 
The majority, on the other hand, asserts that the ECPA did not 
overrule Flowers. The ECPA’s legislative history is devoid of any 
suggestion that Congress intended the revised Act to overrule the 
Flowers precedent. In general, when Congress adopts a new law 
incorporating sections of an old law, Congress is presumed to be 
aware of the way in which courts have interpreted the statute.136 
Therefore, the absence of any mention of the Flowers decision in the 
 
charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal laws” was narrowly construed to 
encompass only officers who served on the front line. Id. Prosecutors, who did not face the 
unique risks of serving on the front line, were held not to be among the individuals protected by 
the law. Id.  
 133. The legislative history of the ECPA suggests that the purpose of the amendment was 
to “update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in 
new computer and telecommunications technologies.” S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), as 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. Specifically, title I of the ECPA expanded the 
Wiretap Act to “take into account modern advances in electronic telecommunications and 
computer technology.” Id. at 3565. 
 134. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) provides that “whoever violates subsection (1) of this section 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” Section 2512(1) 
provides that any person who violates this act “shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.” 
 135. Oceanic Cablevision, Inc. v. M.D. Elecs., 771 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (D. Neb. 1991) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3581). 
 136. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). In Lorillard, the Court noted that 
“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute 
and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Id. at 580 (citations 
omitted). 
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ECPA’s legislative history suggests that Congress did not wish to 
disturb the standing precedent.137  
Finally, the non-passage of section six of the Motion Picture Anti-
Piracy Act138 cuts in favor of the majority. This bill specifically 
recommended that section 2520 be amended to provide a civil 
remedy for any person aggrieved by a violation of section 2512.139 
The fact that Congress considered expanding section 2520 to include 
certain sections of 2512 but ultimately declined to so provides further 
evidence that Congress did not intended to supercede Flowers. 
However, most courts give little weight to legislative histories that 
occur after the enactment of the statute in question.140 
 
 137. But see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940). In Helvering, Justice Frankfurter, 
writing for the Court, indicated that “[i]t would require very persuasive circumstances 
enveloping Congressional silence to debar this Court from reexamining its own doctrines. To 
explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture 
into speculative unrealities.” Id. at 119–20. 
 138. S. 1096, 102d Cong., 137 CONG. REC. 11,322 (1991); H.R. 2367, 102d Cong., 137 
CONG. REC. 11,240 (1991). 
 139. S. 1096. The bill’s sponsor indicated that its purpose was: 
[To a]mend the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to prohibit devices whose 
primary purpose or effect is to deactivate copy-protection systems. This provision now 
carries criminal penalties of up to 5 years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both. The 
measure would make civil remedies available as well, including injunctions, actual and 
punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and litigation costs.  
137 CONG. REC. 11,322. 
 Further, section 6 proposed: 
(a) Section 2520 of title 18, United States Code (relating to recovery of civil damages) 
is amended— 
(1) by inserting “(1)” before “Except”; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
“(2) Any person aggrieved by a violation of –  
“(A) section 2512(1)(a)(ii), 
“(B) section 2512(1)(b)(ii), or 
“(C) section 2512(1)(c) to the extent that such section relates to equipment, devices, 
components, or circuitry described in clause (iii) of such section, may in a civil action 
recover from any person who engaged in that violation such relief as may be 
appropriate.” 
S. 1096. 
 140. “In evaluating the weight to be attached to [post-enactment statements], we begin with 
the oft-repeated warning that ‘the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for 
inferring the intent of an earlier one.’” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 
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C. Policy Rationales 
The proponents of the minority position rely heavily on the 
“private attorney general” argument discussed in Perez.141 The 
minority argues that allowing private parties to initiate civil suits 
under section 2520 would not only deter other pirates,142 but would 
also “help to guarantee the collapse of the manufacture, distribution, 
and use network for interception of electronic communications.”143 
To support this rationale, minority proponents note that federal 
prosecutors do not have sufficient time or resources to investigate and 
litigate these minor, non-violent cases.144 DirecTV, not the 
government, suffers the injury; therefore, DirecTV has the incentive 
to investigate and prosecute.145  
Further, language of the statute itself indicates not only that 
Congress intended to allow private rights of action, but also that it 
wanted to promote such actions. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
statute grants successful plaintiffs a right to attorney’s fees.146 n 
 
447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). But see 
Mont. Wilderness Ass’n. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981). In Montana 
Wilderness Ass’n, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a]lthough a subsequent conference report is not 
entitled to the great weight given subsequent legislation, it is still entitled to significant weight, 
particularly where it is clear that the conferees had carefully considered the issue.” Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
 141. DirecTV, Inc. v. Perez, 279 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see also supra notes 94–
97 and accompanying text. 
 142. Section 2520 provides for punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. 18 
U.S.C. § 2520(b) (2000). Laws that include punitive remedies are inherently deterrent in nature.  
 143. Perez, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 965. In Miller v. Webster, 483 F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Ill. 1979), 
rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Miller v. Webster, 661 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1981), the district 
court ruled that “the public interest in preventing and discovering illegal wiretaps may be 
vindicated in some cases only by a private litigant’s resort to a civil action under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2520.” Id. at 887. 
 144. See Miller, 483 F. Supp. at 890. In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the 
Supreme Court allowed a stockholder to bring a suit against a public company, even though the 
statute in question made no explicit mention of a private cause of action. Id. at 432. The Court 
reasoned that “the possibility of civil damages . . . serves as a most effective weapon in the 
enforcement of [the law]. The [Securities and Exchange] Commission advises that it examines 
over 2,000 proxy statements annually and each of them must necessarily be expedited. Time 
does not permit an independent examination of the facts. . . .” Id.; see also JAMES G. CARR, THE 
LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2:1 (2003) (noting that “resources allocated to 
enforcement of criminal sanctions against illegal surveillance continue to be inadequate”).  
 145. Perez, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 965. 
 146. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000). The statute grants attorneys’ fees only to the successful 
plaintiff, not the prevailing party. Id. As such, successful defendants have no statutory right to 
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addition, section 2520 provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled 
to the greater of actual damages or statutory damages.147 An 
assurance of attorney’s fees encourages plaintiffs to initiate 
litigation.148  
Section 2520(b) provides for punitive damages.149 Any statute that 
provides for punitive damages is designed to have a deterrent effect. 
When an individual who violates a federal law is punished, the 
deterrent effect is accomplished regardless of whether the law is 
enforced by the government or a private party.  
Conversely, the majority argues that the statute not only lacks an 
explicit provision providing a private cause of action, but is also 
devoid of an implied cause of action.150 Courts following the majority 
 
attorneys’ fees. The practical effect of this statute is to mitigate a potential plaintiff’s risks; an 
unsuccessful plaintiff will pay only his or her own attorney’s fees, not the defendant’s as well. 
In Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), Judge Posner, writing for the court, ruled 
that a statute allowing plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases was 
intended to encourage the bringing of meritorious civil rights actions . . . “Private 
attorneys general” should not be deterred from bringing good faith actions to vindicate 
the fundamental rights . . . by the prospect of having to pay their opponent’s counsel 
fees should they lose. By the same token they should not be deterred from bringing 
good faith actions to vindicate fundamental rights by the prospect of sacrificing all 
claims to attorney’s fees for legal work at the trial if they win. 
Id. at 478–79 (internal citations omitted). 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000); see also Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 
252 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that treble damages in a RICO suit encouraged 
private parties to act as private attorneys general). 
 148. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 620 (2001) (holding that a one-sided fee structure indicated that Congress 
intended to encourage designated private attorneys general to enforce federal law). 
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b) (2000). 
 150. In Flowers, the Fourth Circuit noted: “‘It is an elemental cannon of statutory 
construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court 
must be chary of reading others into it.’” Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 
1985) (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)). 
“Congress has expressly provided a criminal sanction against the wiretapper and his agents; we 
must be wary of reading into the statute a further private civil remedy against the seller of a 
device primarily useful for wiretapping.” Flowers, 773 F.2d at 589. 
 In one of its most recent pronouncements on implied rights of action, the Supreme Court 
noted: 
Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must 
be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed 
to determine whether it displays intent to create not just a private right but also a 
private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a 
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approach, including the Fourth Circuit, have ruled that Congress 
enacted section 2512, a criminal statute, to protect the public as a 
whole.151 As such, these courts have declined to hold that conduct 
prohibited in section 2512 can serve as the basis for a civil action 
under section 2520. 
Article III of the United States Constitution requires that a 
plaintiff prove that he or she suffered actual harm as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct to have proper standing for federal 
jurisdiction.152 The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that 
the injury must be “distinct and palpable,” and not “abstract,” 
“conjectural,” or “hypothetical.”153 The majority courts have held that 
proof of mere possession of a pirate access device proves nothing 
more than a hypothetical harm.154  
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have commented 
that, whenever possible, statutes should be interpreted narrowly to 
avoid constitutional infirmities.155 As applied to section 2520, this 
 
cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable 
that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 
 151. Flowers, 773 F.2d at 589. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court 
articulated four factors that a court should consider in determining whether a statute provides a 
private right of action: 
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted” . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? 
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create 
such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of 
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the 
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern 
of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely 
on federal law? 
Id. at 78 (internal citations omitted). Since Cort was decided in 1975, this test has declined in 
popularity. Courts are more likely to use the intent test articulated in Alexander. See supra note 
150. 
 152. U.S. CONST. art III; see also Lujan. v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992); supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 153. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (internal citations omitted). 
 154. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124, 1127 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 155. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). In Catholic Bishop, Catholic 
schools refused to bargain with local labor unions. Id. at 495. The unions filed an unfair labor 
practice suit with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Id. The schools argued that the 
NLRB did not have jurisdiction over them on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Id. The 
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presumption cuts in favor of the majority. Without clear intent to the 
contrary, a court should construe the statute to allow only private 
parties who have suffered actual harm, and who thus have a case or 
controversy as defined by the Constitution, to bring suit under section 
2520 in federal court.  
Support for this argument can be found in the plain language of 
section 2520. Specifically, the statute indicates that a plaintiff “may 
in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in 
that violation such relief as may be appropriate.”156 The words 
“recover” and “relief” both indicate Congress’ intent to create a 
compensatory provision. By definition, compensatory, or actual, 
damages are designed to make a plaintiff who suffered a specific 
injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct whole.157 When there is 
no proof of actual harm, compensatory remedies, such as those 
provided in section 2520(a), are inapplicable.  
A related consequence of the minority’s interpretation is the 
possibility that alleged pirates could be liable to multiple plaintiffs. If 
a plaintiff need not procure proof of actual harm to file suit under 
sections 2512 and 2520, any party whose signals hypothetically could 
have been intercepted would have standing. It is unlikely that 
Congress intended to put unlimited liability on undeserving parties.  
Finally, given the various applications of the equipment used by 
pirates to intercept DBS signals, innocent parties could be wrongly 
prosecuted. William Blackstone famously wrote that “the law holds, 
that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than one innocent 
person suffer.”158 Accordingly, liberty and equity mitigate towards 
the majority’s position.159 
 
Court construed the statute in favor of the schools to avoid issues concerning the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 508. 
 156. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2000) (emphasis added).  
 157. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 416 (8th ed. 2004). Black’s defines compensatory 
damages, or actual damages, as “[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a 
proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses.” Id.  
 158. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 352 (1769).  
 159. The rule of lenity provides a related consideration. The rule suggests that “a court, in 
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, 
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1359 (8th ed. 2004). The question is whether the statute at issue made it 
reasonably clear at the time that the alleged misconduct occurred that the conduct was illegal. 
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1997). If the section lacks clarity, the rule 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The proponents of the minority position advance an intuitively 
pleasing argument. When a consumer purchases a pirate access 
device, it would not be unreasonable for a court to recognize a 
rebuttable presumption that the consumer used the device for its 
intended purpose and injured the DBS provider. Moreover, in the 
absence of any legislative history to the contrary, it seems that the 
only reason Congress passed the ECPA was to provide a private 
cause of action against any violation of the Wiretap Act. In sum, the 
minority believes that DirecTV should be able to protect its 
intangible property from unscrupulous pirates. 
However, the federal courts have made it clear that statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute. Though the 
words of the Wiretap Act do not project a crystal clear meaning, the 
scales tip in favor of the majority’s interpretation. Moreover, a 
narrow interpretation minimizes the potential for constitutional 
infirmities and wrongful convictions. 
 
indicates that the statute should be interpreted as narrowly as reasonably possible. Id. at 266. In 
part, the rationale behind this rule is that due process requires “fair warning . . . of what the law 
intends.” Id.; see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). Though generally 
discussed in criminal cases, the rule of lenity has been applied in other contexts as well. In 
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992), the Court applied the rule of 
lenity to a tax statute in a civil case. Id. at 517–18. In the instant case, the split of authority was 
patent evidence that the statute lacked clarity. As such, under the rule of lenity, the statute 
should be narrowly construed to exclude incorporation of the criminal statute, section 2512. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/17
